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comments. Such an objection bears special significance, as it addresses
a constitutional violation. Finally, counsel must take care to preserve this
issue for appeal on both state and federal grounds.
III. Denial of Court Appointed Psychiatric Expert
Two years after the completion of Gardner's trial, the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Ake v. Oklahoma29 that a defendant had the right to a state
appointed psychiatric expert in cases where sanity at the time of the
offense was an issue. Gardner, whose conviction became final before
Ake was decided, claimed that the rule should be applied retroactively in
his case. However, the court noted that its previous decision inBassette
v. Thompson31 had found the Ake requirement to be a "new rule" as
interpreted in Teague v. Lane.
32
In Teague, the United States Supreme Court held that a habeas
petitioner defendant may not employ a new rule from a case decided after
his sentence became final unless the case falls under one of two
exceptions. 33 The new rule doctrine does not apply if the conduct in
question was (1) "beyond the power of the law-making authority to
29 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
30 915 F.2d at 938-39. See case summary of Bassette, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 8 (1991).
31 Gardner, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS at *33; Teague, 489 U.S. 288
(1989). In Teague, a defendant attempted to invoke, upon collateral
review, the new rule from Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, that the
prosecutor must give a racially neutral justification for his use of
peremptory challenges. The Court held that Batson was a "new rule"
which could not be retroactively applied. The Teague Court defined a
"new rule" as one which "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation
on the States or Federal Government .... or if the result was not dictated
by precedent." 489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis in original).
32 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
proscribe, '34 or (2) "if it requires the observance of 'those procedures
that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'. ' 35 Neither exception
applied to Gardner, and, therefore, because Ake was decided after his
sentence had become final, Ake could not be retroactively applied upon
collateral review.
36
The Teague decision should put defense counsel on notice that the
Supreme Court intends to seriously curtail access to federal habeas
corpus review. Taking this into consideration, counsel must be most
conscientious in developing and advancing all possible constitutional
arguments, both state and federal, at the earliest possible stages of the
proceedings so as to avoid permanently waiving them. Preserving issues
for appeal also allows the defendant to take advantage of any favorable
changes in the law. In the meantime, counsel should continue to advance
new rules, even on habeas, because they may fit within the exceptions,
and to test the limits to which the Court is willing to carry the Teague
"new rule" doctrine.
Summary and Analysis by:
Paul M. O'Grady
33 Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692
(1971)).
34 Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S.at 693 (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))).
35 For a more extensive discussion of the "new rule" doctrine, see
case summary of Williams v. Dixon, Capital Defense Digest, this issue;
case summary of Adams v. Aiken, Capital Defense Digest, this issue; and
case summary of Stringer v. Black, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
36 See, e.g. Williamsv.Dixon,691 F.2d448 (4thCir. 1992) (finding
that even if the Court's ruling in McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433
(1990), was a new rule, it fell within an exception to Teague and thus
could be retroactively applied). See case summary of Williams, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
SPANN v. MARTIN
963 F.2d 663 (1992)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
In October 1981, Sterling Barnett Spann was indicted for criminal
sexual conduct in the first degree, robbery, burglary, and murder of an 82-
year-old widow. He was convicted on all counts and received a life
sentence for the burglary, thirty years (consecutively) for criminal sexual
conduct in the first degree, ten years (consecutively) for robbery, and
death by electrocution for murder.
Spann appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which
affirmed both the conviction and the sentence.1 Spann then appealed to
the United States Supreme Court, which dismissed his appeal.2 He
subsequently began state postconviction proceedings, claiming ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel and alleging various guilt and sentencing
errors, but the state court denied his petition. Spann's petition for
certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court was denied in 1985.
Spann's subsequent petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court was also denied. In 1986, Spann filed for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina. The court referred the matter to a magistrate for findings and
1 State v. Spann, 308 S.E.2d 518 (S.C. 1983).
2 Spann v. South Carolina, 466 U.S. 947 (1984).
recommendations. The magistrate subsequently filed a 173-page report
and recommendation. After a ninety-day extension, petitioner filed
objections to the report and sought to amend his habeas corpus petition.
In 1988, the district court allowed the amendment and once again
submitted the matter to the magistrate. A fifty-page recommendation
followed, as did a response (and two supplemental memoranda) by
petitioner.
In February 1991, Spann "filed a motion for leave 'to reexhaust his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the South Carolina Courts in
light ofFreti v. State," 3 a new state case. The U.S. District Court granted
Spann's request and dismissed the writ without prejudice. The issue
before the Fourth Circuit was whether the district court abused its
discretion in granting that motion without prejudice.
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
the district court abused its discretion in granting Spann's motion to
dismiss withoutprejudice. 4 The court found thattherespondent (here the
3 Spann v. Martin, 963 F.2d 663,671; Frett, 378 S.E.2d 249 (S.C.
1988).
4 Spann, 963 F.2d at 672.
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State of South Carolina) and the public have vital interests in the prompt
and fair resolution of habeas claims. 5 Further, the court found that the
court had a "'virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdic-
tion given them.' 6 Such an obligation became even more compelling
in light of the nature of the crimes and the length of delay in the case
before the court.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In its recounting of Spann's process through the judicial system, the
Fourth Circuit did little to hide its ire at the administrative burden and
delay occasioned by Spann's various motions. In its findings, the court
recounted the series of delays, extensions, and amendments won for
Spann by his counsel. The court balanced these against the federal
magistrate's "comprehensive ... careful0 and meticulous0 '"7 recom-
mendations--over two hundred pages of documents. Finding Spann's
5 Id. at 673.
6 Id. (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).
7 Id. at 672.
8 Id. at 673.
newly alleged state claim frivolous and refusing to add to the already
"embarassing length of time that has elapsed since the case was filed in
the federal courts," the court reversed and remanded to the district court
for determinations onthe two issues the district court had not yet formally
ruled upon.8
Virginia practitioners will want to make note of the court's growing
impatience with what it sees as administrative delays that work against
state and public interests.9 The net effect of such impatience for those
representing capital defendants would seem to be that errors and possible
remedies should be raised early and often. Saving them for later habeas
relief will most likely result in their loss.
Summary and analysis by:
Roberta F. Green
9 The United States Supreme Court has demonstrated similar
impatience in the area of requests for stays of executions. See In re
Blodgett, 112 S.Ct. 674 (1992). See case summary of Blodgett, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
DAVIDSON v. COMMONWEALTH
244 Va. 129,419 S.E.2d 656 (1992)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On June 13, 1990, Mickey Wayne Davidson killed his wife, Doris
Jane, and his two teenage stepdaughters, Mamie Darnell Clatterbuck and
Tammy Lynn Clatterbuck. Autopsies revealed that each victim had been
beaten with a crowbar. Davidson's wife, Doris, suffered numerous
lacerations to her head and face, skull fractures, and bruises and contu-
sions to the brain. Mamie suffered the most extensive injuries, with
severe injuries to her head and face. Tammy suffered blows to her head,
face and chest.
A psychologist examined Davidson and found him competent to
stand trial and to make decisions regarding trial strategy. At the guilt
phase of trial, Davidson pled guilty to each charge of capital murder.
Before accepting the guilty pleas, the trial court heard witness testimony
and considered numerous exhibits. The court also examined Davidson
and determined that the guilty pleas were made knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently. The court accepted the pleas and found Davidson
guilty of the three capital murder charges. The court ordered a pre-
sentence investigation report.
At the penalty phase of the trial, Davidson's counsel advised the
court that Davidson had ordered counsel not to present any mitigating
evidence. Davidson then testified that he had been fully advised by his
counsel of the charges against him, his right to a competency evaluation,
and the possible sentences he could receive. He further testified that he
had waived the competency evaluation and that he had directed that no
evidence be presented on his behalf during the penalty stage. The court
then considered the evidence presented by the Commonwealth and the
1 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990); Va. Code Ann. §19.2-
264.4(c) (1990).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1 (1990).
3 Davidson v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 129, 138,419 S.E.2d 656,
661 (1992).
pre-sentence report and found that Davidson's conduct in the commis-
sion of the offenses satisfied the "depravity of mind" and "aggravated
battery" components of the Virginia "vileness" aggravating factor. I The
court sentenced Davidson to death.
A timely notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia was filed
by Davidson's lawyers, but Davidson requested permission to waive his
appeal of right. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and
found Davidson's waiver to be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
made.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia conducted its mandatory review of
the imposition of Davidson's death sentence 2 and affirmed the trial
court's actions.
3
First, the Court confirmed the trial court's finding of two aggravat-
ing factors, depravity of mind and aggravated battery, either of which are
sufficient for the imposition of the death penalty.4 The Court also held
that the trial court was not "under the influence of passion, prejudice or
any other arbitrary factor" in imposing the death sentence on Davidson.
5
The Court further held that under the circumstances of Davidson's case,
the sentence of death was not "excessive nor disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases."
'6
Because the court treated these issues in a summary fashion under
its mandatory review, they are not fully discussed here. The focus instead
is on the duties imposed under Virginia law for presenting mitigating
evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.
4 Id. at 135-136,419 S.E.2d at660. See Va. CodeAnn. § 19.2-264.2
(1990); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (1990).
5 Davidson, 244 Va. at 137-138, 419 S.E.2d at 661.
6 Id. at 136, 419 S.E.2d at 660.
